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FOREWORD: THE NEW FRONTIER OF STATE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
JAMES A. GARDNER* & JIM Rossi**
State constitutions have entered into a new interpretive era. Once
considered documents of parochial import worthy of little serious
study by anyone outside of a state's individual jurisdiction, in the
late twentieth century state and federal judges, along with legal
academics, began to recognize the potential of state constitutions
as important sources of law. A borrowing mentality emerged, as
courts looked outside of their jurisdictional territories to state
constitutions to fill gaps in constitutional interpretation. This
borrowing approach, however, relied heavily on a kind of juris-
dictional positivism that conceived of state constitutions as funda-
mentally free-standing sources of fully independent legal norms.'
Although this approach satisfied a temporary political need for the
legitimation of an independent jurisprudence of state constitutional
rights, it was increasingly called into question by judges and
scholars who challenged its descriptive accuracy and normative
desirability, and who looked instead toward a broader trans-
jurisdictional discourse of constitutional law.2
* Professor of Law and William J. Magavern Faculty Scholar, State University of New
York, University at Buffalo Law School.
** Harry M. Walborsky Professor and Associate Dean for Research, Florida State
University College of Law. The authors wish to acknowledge the invaluable contributions of
Neal Devins, Melody Nichols, the William and Mary Institute for Bill of Rights Law, and the
editors of the William and Mary Law Review to the success of the symposium on Dual
Enforcement of Constitutional Norms and to this symposium issue.
1. William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights,
90 HARv. L. REV. 489 (1977); Hans A. Linde, First Things First: Rediscovering the States'Bill
of Rights, 9 U. BALT. L. REV. 379 (1980).
2. See Honorable Christine M. Durham, What Goes Around Comes Around: The New
Relevancy of State Constitution Religion Clauses, 38 VAL. U. L. REV. 353 (2004); James A.
Gardner, State Courts as Agents of Federalism: Power and Interpretation in State
Constitutional Law, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1725 (2003); Daniel B. Rodriguez, State
Constitutional Theory and Its Prospects, 28 N.M. L. REV. 271 (1998).
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In the past decade, a new frontier of constitutional discourse has
begun to emerge, adding a fresh perspective to state constitutional
law. Instead of treating states as jurisdictional islands in a sea
under reign of the federal government, this new approach sees
states as co-equals among themselves and between them and the
federal government -'n a collective enterprise of democratic self-
governance. This symposium, organized around the theme of Dual
Enforcement of Constitutional Norms, provides the occasion for
leading scholars on state constitutional law to take a fresh look
at their subject by adopting a vantage point outside of the individu-
alized jurisdictional context. The symposium invited participants to
consider directly whether state and federal constitutional law are
separate and distinct systems of law, each with its own doctrines,
traditions, and dominant norms, or whether state and federal
constitutional law may profitably be understood as complementary
features of a shared project of elaborating and enforcing shared
constitutional norms. The articles in this issue lie along what we
hope will prove to be a new frontier that moves courts and scholars
closer to a sustainable interpretive theory of state constitutions,
shedding important light on the role of state courts, while also
addressing the federal judicial role in a system of dual enforcement.
I. STATE CONSTITUTIONS AND THEIR CONCEPTUAL SETTING IN THE
LATE TWENTIETH CENTURY
Although as a matter of chronological history state constitutions
preceded, and to a significant extent provided models for, the U.S.
Constitution, contemporary state constitutionalism was born in the
shadow of the federal rights jurisprudence of the Warren Court.
During that period, a highly active U.S. Supreme Court not only
dramatically expanded the reach and impact of the rights protected
by the Federal Bill of Rights, but also, through the incorporation
doctrine and the Supremacy Clause, imposed its constraints on state
governments.' As a result, state constitutional law was seen, not
3. For a recent discussion of this history, see Robert K Fitzpatrick, Note, Neither Icarus
Nor Ostrich: State Constitutions as an Independent Source of Individual Rights, 79 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 1833, 1836-38 (2004).
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illogically, as in some fundamental way subordinate to national
constitutional law.
Because the Federal Constitution seemed, in that historical con-
text, to supply a reasonably complete set of constitutional norms,
and because these federal norms by law displaced any inconsistent
norms contained in state constitutions, state courts often acted as
though they need not bother to look any further than the shared
national principles embodied in the U.S. Constitution. State courts
typically expressed this deference by looking reflexively to the
U.S. Supreme Court for the solutions to virtually all problems of
constitutional law, treating state and national constitutional law as
essentially uniform and thus interchangeable.
This highly deferential approach soon provoked considerable
criticism from the bench and the academy, leading to a movement
to liberate state constitutional law from the overbearing influence
of its federal counterpart. A revolution needs an ideology, and the
revolutionaries found theirs in a strong form of jurisdictional
positivism that conceived of state constitutions as entirely independ-
ent sources of legal norms arising from organic and fundamentally
local social and political processes, of which state constitutions were
both the culmination and the embodiment. State courts were thus
urged to interpret state constitutions by looking more or less
exclusively to the state document to tease out what were presumed
to be homegrown solutions to commonplace constitutional problems.
This approach provided a much-needed justification for state courts
to deviate from the path charted by the U.S. Supreme Court, a need
increasingly felt during the Burger and early Rehnquist years, when
the Court adopted an approach to individual rights that was more
conservative than some state judges wished to pursue.
Eventually, however, the independent approach to state constitu-
tional interpretation itself began to show its limitations. It could not
plausibly account for the striking similarity of most contemporary
state constitutions to one another and to the Federal Constitution.
Its interpretive methodology sometimes drove state courts to make
dubious claims about the social and ideological distinctiveness of
their state polities. Furthermore, it has been seriously undermined
in practice by state courts themselves, many of which utterly ignore
its prescriptions and continue to look primarily to federal constitu-
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tional law and the Supreme Court for guidance. These developments
compromised the normative and descriptive appeal of the independ-
ent approach, prompting scholars to take another look at state
constitutional law, this time focusing on its structural role in the
American system of federalism.
II. THE EMERGENCE OF THE NEW FRONTIER: TOWARD A REGIME OF
DUAL ENFORCEMENT
A new trend is emerging in scholarship about state constitutional
law. Although the movement for state constitutional independence
is universally and gratefully acknowledged for having taken a nec-
essary step along the road to a conceptually well-founded jurispru-
dence of state constitutionalism, it is also seen as having adopted
a position that, in its reaction against the unreflective linkage of
state and federal constitutional law, turned further in the opposite
direction than was strictly necessary. In correcting for this under-
standable overcompensation, scholars have begun to turn away
from the suggestion that state judges treat state constitutions as
independent documents. Instead, they have turned toward develop-
ing more nuanced theories of the interaction of state and federal
constitutional law. This new trend allows scholars, as well as courts,
to account for and accept some of the common practices of state
constitutional adjudication, while still subjecting those practices to
meaningful normative critique. It also provides scholars and courts
a way of conceptualizing the role of federal courts in interpreting
state constitutions.
The articles in this symposium issue represent a wide variety
of responses to this emerging new approach. In the first article,
James Gardner illustrates why strict constitutional positivism-by
which he means an interpretive technique that assumes a unique,
determinate and self-constructed polity-provides a weak normative
basis for state constitutional interpretation.4 Gardner observes
that state courts are often criticized for failing to heed positivist
interpretive techniques: "they ignore subtle (and sometimes not-so-
subtle) cues contained in the state constitutional text; they fail to
4. See James A. Gardner, Whose Constitution Is It? Why Federalism and Constitutional
Positivism Don't Mix, 46 WM. & MARY. L. REV. 1245 (2005).
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inquire into the views of the state constitution's framers; and they
undertake no meaningful investigation into the history of their
state or the development of its constitution."5 Gardner suggests that
we look beyond this narrowly positivist interpretive technique,
searching for "not only state sources of constitutional meaning but
also corresponding national sources."6 As he observes, the presence
of non-autonomous subnational units poses a particular challenge
to strict positivism.7 In addition, political theories that increasingly
recognize shared identity, such as occurs when individuals are
simultaneously citizens of both a state and a nation, blur the clear
political boundaries that jurisdictional positivism demands.8
Gardner's analysis has several implications for the interpretation
of state constitutions. First, a national constitution "belongs to" a
citizen of the polity in the strongest possible way, calling into
question the primacy of state constitutions.9 Positivism as a
technique only makes sense where subnational units are autono-
mous, as independent nations are.10 Moreover, it must be recognized
that a state constitution is not solely the product of the state polity,
"but is rather the outcome of more comprehensive processes in
which both the state and national polities participate."'1 Gardner
thus argues that state constitutional interpretation "inevitably will
require at least some resort to national norms and sources of
constitutional meaning."12 Gardner proceeds to apply this more
cosmopolitan approach to two constitutional practices of state
courts: consulting the constitutions of other jurisdictions as an aid
to interpretation, and constitutional "wormholes," provisions in
state constitutions that deliberately incorporate concepts or
values developed by other polities. As Gardner suggests, there is a
way to construe constitutional positivism to be consistent with these
practices, but "we must abandon the idea that the meaning of a
5. Id. at 1247.
6. Id. at 1270.
7. Id. at 1269-71.
8. Id. at 1256-59.
9. Id. at 1249-53.
10. See id. at 1252-53.
11. Id. at 1261.
12. Id. at 1261.
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state constitutional provision is determined solely by reference to
sources of meaning associated with that constitution.' 3
Hans Linde, an early and consistent leader in the movement
critiquing the deferential approach to state constitutional jurispru-
dence, 14 sat on the Oregon Supreme Court for more than a dozen
years. In his contribution to the symposium, Linde emphasizes
that the "[t]he point of federalism ... lies in the scope it leaves for
differences."'5 His analysis focuses on structural constitutional
issues in state governance, such as standing, ripeness and
mootness. Textually, 6 historically,' 7 and institutionally, 8 Linde
shows that state courts play a very different role in structural
governance issues than their federal counterparts.
By focusing on differences between the litigation of state and
federal constitutional structure issues in governance, rather than
the convergence of constitutional meaning, Linde suggests that we
can identify the limits of resort to federal constitutional doctrines
as a source for state constitutional interpretation. He concludes
"[n]othing in the typical texts, the history, or the institutions of most
state governments calls for reading the formulas used by the United
States Supreme Court into a state's constitution." 9 While Gardner
urges that we expand constitutional positivism to include such a
possibility, Linde does not see the resort to federal constitutional
doctrine as compelled by state constitutional interpretation.
In the next article, Robert Pushaw addresses the enforcement
gaps created when state courts "creatively expand or contract
constitutional rights."2 Pushaw's article focuses on the growing set
of precedents state courts are creating on issues of federal constitu-
tional law. Doctrines of judicial restraint, such as justiciability
13. Id. at 1270.
14. See Hans A. Linde, E Pluribus--Constitutional Theory and State Courts, 18 GA. L.
REV. 165 (1984); Linde, supra note 1.
15. Hans A. Linde, The State and Federal Courts in Governance: Vive La Diffirence!, 46
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1273 (2005).
16. See id. at 1283.
17. See id. at 1278-79.
18. See id. at 1276-79.
19. Id. at 1288.
20. Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Bridging the Enforcement Gap in Constitutional Law: A
Critique of the Supreme Court's Theory that Self.Restraint Promotes Federalism, 46 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1289, 1289 (2005).
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(standing, ripeness, and mootness), abstention, and other doctrines
increasingly justified by reference to a "states' rights" vision of
federalism-including the well-pleaded complaint rule, the adequate
and independent state grounds doctrine, and sovereign immu-
nity-have carved out what Pushaw describes as a substantial set
of exceptions to federal question jurisdiction in federal courts.2'
Pushaw's concern is not state constitutional provisions per se, but
how these exceptions to federal question jurisdiction entrust
fundamental issues of federal constitutional rights to state supreme
courts.
Pushaw carefully argues that this growing trend of entrustment
of federal constitutional law to state courts conflicts with originalist
principles of judicial federalism.22 He characterizes this trend as a
device to control federal dockets, arising out of the post-Reconstruc-
tion growth in federal law.2" As Pushaw argues, "Article III courts
have an indispensable role in ensuring the supremacy and unifor-
mity of federal law, especially the Constitution."24 Pushaw warns
that, in contrast to federal judges, state judges are motivated by
parochial concerns to the extent they '"ave personal and political
incentives to favor their home state parties and interests."25 In order
to guard against such concerns in constitutional interpretation,
Pushaw proposes a judicially crafted exception to diversity jurisdic-
tion: that "federal courts should require the party invoking their
jurisdiction to make a colorable showing that a state judge or court
is likely to be biased against either her personally or out-of-staters
generally."26 He also suggests that the adequate and independent
state grounds doctrine be abolished, and recommends some changes
to justiciability doctrines, abstention, the well-pleaded complaint
rule, and state sovereign immunity,27 in order "[T]o maintain the
supremacy and uniformity of federal law."28 He concludes with the
somewhat radical conclusion that "the Court restructure its
21. See id. at 1291-1309.
22. See id. at 1312-24.
23. See id. at 1324-28.
24. Id. at 1328.
25. Id. at 1330.
26. Id. at 1331.
27. See id. at 1334-41.
28. See id. at 1337-38.
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jurisdictional doctrines to ensure that federal judges adjudicate all
cases involving federal constitutional rights, and correspondingly
eliminate as many state-law controversies as possible."29
A foundational premise of the symposium is that reconceiving
state constitutions as parts of a single, complex piece of national
constitutional architecture can yield both descriptive and conceptual
benefits. In his contribution to the symposium, Jim Rossi demon-
strates the conceptual payoff by focusing on two recurring problems
of cooperative federalism: state implementation of federal program-
matic directives and state administrative borrowing of federal
regulatory standards.3 ° In both of these situations, Rossi observes,
the state constitution may constrain the ability of state agencies to
administer programs in the way they desire.31 Most commonly, a
strict nondelegation doctrine, rooted in the state constitutional
separation of powers, may appear to bar a state legislature from
authorizing state agencies to comply with, or even voluntarily to
adopt, relevant principles of federal law.32
Federal courts, Rossi argues, have "solved" this problem by
wielding the sledgehammer of federal preemption, a crude ap-
proach that accords no role at all to state constitutions in structur-
ing the internal processes of state self-government.33 State courts,
on the other hand, have attempted to preserve the benefits of
inter-governmental programmatic cooperation by minimizing
state constitutional constraints on agency behavior. Their strategy,
however, as Rossi shows, has been to cut state agencies the
necessary constitutional slack by adopting strained and unconvinc-
ing justifications for relaxing state constitutional principles of
separated powers. 4 Rossi proposes a better and more nuanced
approach based on comparative institutional analysis, informed by
the dual constitutional model. State constitutions, he argues, should
not in general be construed to bar state administrative compliance
29. Id. at 1341.
30. See Jim Rossi, Dual Constitutions and Constitutional Duels: Separation of Powers and
State Implementation of Federally Inspired Regulatory Programs and Standards, 46 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1343 (2005).
31. See id. at 1345-49.
32. Id. at 1359-62.
33. Id. at 1353-55.
34. See id. at 1363-70.
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with, or adoption of, federal legal norms, because state constitu-
tional nondelegation doctrines are better understood as responses
to governance failures particular to state-level democracy, failures
that have no relevance when a state legislature indirectly delegates
power to the national government rather than to an organ of state
government.35
Following Rossi's tight close-up of a fine detail of the dual
constitutional structure, Lawrence Sager pans out to examine the
large-scale movements of the mechanism by which dual con-
stitutionalism generates and enfolds moral norms.36 One of the
benefits of a federal system, he argues, is its capacity to accommo-
date and even to encourage moral progress.37 Sager envisions this
as a continual process in which moral experimentation occurs in a
small number of vanguard states, propagates itself within the
system through the accumulation of experience and the gradual
alteration of public opinion, and finally consolidates itself by
migrating to the national level, where formerly cutting-edge moral
norms are incorporated, constitutionalized, and then imposed on
straggler states to create a new-but only temporary -uniformity. 38
From this account of the dual constitutional mechanism, Sager
goes on to propose how federal constitutional doctrine might best
secure its benefits. In particular, Sager argues, premature federal
interference with state moral experimentation should be minimized,
but national enforcement of newly accepted principles should be
robust, two principles that, he contends, need not be in tension. 9
Similarly, Sager defends both a presumption against federal pre-
emption and federal judicial practices that avoid hasty leaps to the
constitutional bottom line in order to allow states some breathing
space in exploring potential avenues of moral progress.4"
One of the longstanding attractions of the view that federal and
state constitutions are completely independent is its simplicity;
reconceptualizing state and federal constitutions as partners in a
35. See id. at 1370-83.
36. See Lawrence G. Sager, Cool Federalism and the Life-Cycle of Moral Progress, 46 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 1385, 1387-88 (2005).
37. See id. at 1386.
38. See id. at 1387-88.
39. See id. at 1391-95.
40. See id. at 1395-97.
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shared enterprise carries a price in conceptual complexity. Robert
Schapiro not only embraces this complexity but finds ample grounds
to praise it in his article on interjurisdictional enforcement of
individual rights.41 The unusual dual structure of the American
judiciary, Schapiro argues, creates a system of "intersystemic
adjudication [that] provides a way for state and federal courts to
work together to safeguard important liberties. 42
Building on a model of "polyphonic" judicial federalism that he
has previously developed,43 Schapiro takes issue with several
well-established principles of federal adjudication that counsel
federal courts to avoid construing state constitutions. In fact,
Schapiro argues, federal adjudication of state constitutional claims
can in many circumstances yield substantial benefits by multiplying
the institutional settings in which such claims are considered,
generating intersystemic dialogue on the meaning of constitutional
principles, and better utilizing available system redundancy to
maximize the effectuation of recognized rights.44 In defending his
account of an expanded federal adjudicatory role, Schapiro rejects
the view that Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins45 requires a complete
separation of the state and federal judicial spheres. 4' Nothing in
Erie's account of state and national judicial authority, he argues,
impugns the legitimacy of intersystemic judicial dialogue and
cooperation, which can go a long way toward reducing error in both
systems.47
Chief Justice Randall T. Shepard of Indiana is a leading practitio-
ner of another kind of valuable intersystemic dialogue, the kind that
links the bench and the academy. In his contribution, Chief Justice
Shepard delivers a forthright critique of federal courts for treating
state constitutions like "just another piece of paper" rather than
41. Robert A. Schapiro, Interjurisdictional Enforcement of Rights in a Post-Erie World, 46
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1399 (2005).
42. Id. at 1401.
43. See Robert A. Schapiro, Judicial Deference and Interpretive Coordinacy in State and
Federal Constitutional Law, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 656 (2000); Robert A. Schapiro, Polyphonic
Federalism: State Constitutions in the Federal Courts, 87 CAL. L. REV. 1409 (1999).
44. Schapiro, supra note 41, at 1417-23.
45. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
46. See Schapiro, supra note 41, at 1423-31.
47. Id. at 1426-31.
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important documents that have real significance for structuring
state governance.48
Turning first to the issue of remedies for federal constitutional
violations, Chief Justice Shepard argues that federal courts have too
often viewed state constitutional provisions structuring the internal
self-governance of the state as literally irrelevant to the crafting of
remedial orders.49 Similarly, he explains, federal courts routinely
ignore state constitutional restrictions on the authority of state law
enforcement officials by admitting into evidence in federal prosecu-
tions materials that state police have obtained in violation of the
state constitution.' In these situations, Shepard maintains, federal
courts should join in the enforcement of rights protected by the state
constitution rather than treat that task as belonging solely to the
state judiciary."' He concludes by examining the certification of
questions of state constitutional law, a federal procedure that he
finds in principle more respectful of the role of state constitutions,
but that in practice leaves room for improvement. 52
If many of the symposium participants have stressed the distinct
institutional positions of state and federal courts, Michael Solimine
turns his attention to a shared function that has long been thought
to presuppose equivalence: the enforcement by state courts of
federal constitutional rights.53 Solimine, a leading participant in
ongoing debates over the "parity" of state and federal courts54-state
courts' willingness and ability to effectively enforce federal constitu-
tional rights-reviews the course of those debates and concludes
that critics of state judicial parity have reached skeptical conclu-
sions about the abilities of state courts only in consequence of
asking the wrong questions.
Solimine begins by reviewing the empirical literature on parity,
as well as a corresponding set of critiques that have been leveled at
48. See Randall T. Shepard, In a Federal Case, Is the State Constitution Something
Important or Just Another Piece of Paper?, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1437, 1437 (2005).
49. See id. at 1440-43.
50. See id. at 1445-52.
51. See id. at 1451-52.
52. See id. at 1452-55.
53. See Michael E. Solimine, The Future of Parity, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1457 (2005).
54. See MICHAEL E. SOLIMINE & JAMES L. WALKER, RESPECTING STATE COURTS: THE
INEVITABILITY OF JUDICIAL FEDERALISM (1999).
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its methods and conclusions. These critiques, Solimine explains,
implicitly measure state judicial parity in the enforcement of federal
constitutional rights against a criterion of uniformity in result.55
This criterion, he contends, is inappropriate because it rests on a
false assumption. In fact, Solimine argues, the federal structure of
dual judicial systems, far from presupposing uniformity, presup-
poses to some degree its opposite: that state courts will exercise
independence in the performance of their national law enforcement
functions, and that this space in the system will allow for a useful
percolation of ideas.56 Future attempts to assess parity, he argues,
must look not to the results in individual cases, but to broad
influences in the institutional environment. For example, state
adoption of federal procedural rules and state efforts to contain the
politicization of state judicial election campaigns are convergence-
inducing influences that may create and maintain the conditions
from which parity may result.57
In a fitting conclusion to this symposium issue, Robert F.
Williams, a trailblazing pioneer in the analysis and critique of state
constitutional interpretation, takes a fresh look at the commonplace
state constitutional practice of lockstep interpretation.58 In a series
of now-classic articles, Williams argued powerfully that lockstep
interpretation constitutes a kind of abdication of state judicial
responsibility for construing the state constitution.59 In his contribu-
tion to this symposium, Williams once more places lockstep
interpretation under the microscope, but concludes, more sympa-
thetically, that not all lockstepping is equivalent, and that certain
varieties of lockstepping might in fact represent logical and
reasoned responses to the institutional environment in which state
courts find themselves.6"
55. See Solimine, supra note 53, at 1469-72.
56. See id. at 1481-86.
57. See id. at 1487-94.
58. See Robert F. Williams, State Courts Adopting Federal Constitutional Doctrine: Case-
by-Case Adoptionism or Prospective Lockstepping?, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1499 (2005).
59. See Robert F. Williams, In the Supreme Court's Shadow: Legitimacy of State Rejection
of Supreme Court Reasoning and Result, 35 S. CAL. L. REV. 353, 402 (1984); Robert F.
Williams, Methodology Problems in Enforcing State Constitutional Rights, 3 GA. ST. U. L. REV.
143, 171-76 (1987).
60. See, e.g., Williams, supra note 58, at 1527-29.
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Williams begins his reexamination by disaggregating lockstep
interpretation into several varieties: unreflective adoption of federal
law,6 reflective adoption of federal law,62 and various species of
"prospective lockstepping."63 This more nuanced taxonomy of
lockstep practices, Williams argues, allows us to avoid unjustifiably
condemning all lockstepping in the mistaken belief that its only
possible cause is bad or irresponsible judging.' Williams's analysis
thus not only acknowledges that lockstepping may in some
circumstances be supported by substantial jurisprudential justi-
fications, but it also legitimates lockstep interpretation, in its
benign forms, as a potentially valuable mode of interjurisdictional
dialogue and positioning within federalism's framework of dual
constitutionalism.65
CONCLUSION
Although the articles in this symposium explore new trends in
state constitutional discourse, many of the issues raised by them
remain unsettled. The new trend may not be as robust as past
efforts in its ability to account for common interpretive practices in
state constitutional adjudication. The normative critique of new
scholarship presents many deeper, and more contested, issues with
which state constitutionalism must grapple. And courts and
scholars will continue to disagree about the role of federal courts in
interpreting state constitutions. Although these questions may be
unsettling to those who yearn for predictability in constitutional
law, we hope that the articles in this issue convey how exciting the
challenges and opportunities of a new frontier can be for state
constitutionalism.
61. See id. at 1505-06.
62. See id. at 1506-09.
63. Id. at 1509-20.
64. Id. at 1527-29.
65. See id. at 1527-31.

